{"id":2080,"date":"2013-11-11T03:05:16","date_gmt":"2013-11-11T03:05:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/benbansal.me\/?p=2080"},"modified":"2013-11-11T14:53:59","modified_gmt":"2013-11-11T14:53:59","slug":"china-learning-from-japan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/?p=2080","title":{"rendered":"China learning from Japan"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>I went to a <a href=\"http:\/\/energypolicy.columbia.edu\/events-calendar\/chinas-challenges-lessons-japan\">presentation<\/a> by <a href=\"http:\/\/som.yale.edu\/stephen-roach\">Stephen Roach<\/a> (former chief economist of Morgan Stanley) a couple of weeks ago. He started off with a good overview of current global financial imbalances. Yet I felt he fell short on delivering on the presentation title&#8217;s promise &#8211; showing how China can learn from Japan &#8211; in good ways and in bad. Some of the topics I would have liked to be seen addressed after the jump.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/11\/shanghai01.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-2083 alignnone\" alt=\"shanghai01\" src=\"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/11\/shanghai01-580x435.jpg\" width=\"580\" height=\"435\" srcset=\"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/11\/shanghai01-580x435.jpg 580w, https:\/\/benbansal.me\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/11\/shanghai01.jpg 900w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p><em>Shanghai haze viewed from Pudong<\/em><\/p>\n<p><!--more-->Japan has made plenty of experiences other aspiring emerging markets such as China probably want to avoid: The balance sheet deflation brought about by years of over-leverage is one of them. One oft-quoted reason, the Plaza Accord in 1985, serves today as an important reminder to China to retain full control over its currency (although <a href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/weo\/2011\/01\/c1\/box1_4.pdf\">the impact<\/a> the Plaza Accord had on Japan&#8217;s &#8220;lost decade&#8221; is not entirely straightforward).<\/p>\n<p>Yet perhaps we can start even <a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/2011\/01\/03\/us-china-economy-japan-idUSTRE7021TB20110103\">earlier than the 1980s in assessing what China can learn from Japan.<\/a> For one, we want to compare apples with apples. China&#8217;s development is by most measures still many years behind that of Japan. One good yardstick is the economy&#8217;s size relative to that of the US. Here\u00a0it&#8217;s probably best to look at GDP per capita in purchasing power terms.<\/p>\n<p>As of 2012, China&#8217;s per capita GDP is about 18% that of the US.\u00a0Japan had reached that milestone already before the economic miracle unfolded. According to economic historian <a href=\"http:\/\/knoema.com\/HSWE\/historical-statistics-of-the-world-economy-1-2008-ad\">Angus Maddison&#8217;s data<\/a>, this took place just after WWII, between 1947 and 1948. The onset of the growth spurt, i.e. 1953, already saw GDP per capita in Japan at 23% of that of the US.<\/p>\n<p>At the end of this first stage of miracle growth, which most people put at the first oil crisis in 1973, Japan&#8217;s per capita GDP as a proportion of the US&#8217;s was 69%. Catch-up had almost completely run its course by then.\u00a0Today, Japan&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita\">per capita GDP in PPP terms<\/a> stands at 70%, reflecting that despite another one and a half decades of relatively fast growth after 1973, two decades of sub-par growth from 1990 onwards have eaten away at Japan&#8217;s relative economic prowess.<\/p>\n<p>One important marker in post-war Japan is the tenure of prime minister Hayato Ikeda from 1960 (Japan 35% of US per capita PPP GDP) until 1964 (44%). His <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jimin.jp\/english\/about_ldp\/history\/104278.html\">&#8220;income doubling plan&#8221;<\/a> stood on three pillars: 1) tax cuts, 2) improvements in social security and 3) public investment with a focus on infrastructure. Without going into much detail, Japanese growth over the 1960s was both rapid (58% of US GDP per capita by 1969)\u00a0and broad-based (income inequality\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/stats.areppim.com\/listes\/list_gini_1960x2011.htm\">fell<\/a> over the same period).<\/p>\n<p>Because as the world talks about <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mckinsey.com\/insights\/asia-pacific\/chinas_great_rebalancing_promise_and_peril\">China&#8217;s rebalancing<\/a> with increasing urgency, everyone agrees that Chinese consumers need to be empowered and investment as a share of GDP should be lowered. Social security and income tax cuts are key measures to achieve this. A more equitable distribution of income is another priority, especially between the rural and urban population.<\/p>\n<p>Japan managed to avoid the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/wp\/2013\/wp1371.pdf\">middle income trap<\/a>\u00a0and join the &#8220;advanced&#8221; nations club. Whether or not all this wealth was built on a house of cards is somewhat besides the point, as even sub-par growth during the 1990s and 2000s was able to maintain Japan&#8217;s leading position as Asia&#8217;s richest nation.<\/p>\n<p>And while it is important to understand what <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/s\/0\/3c5b388e-ffb2-11de-921f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2jv8iSOOm\">lessons China can draw<\/a> from the experience of Japan&#8217;s troubled decades following the bust in 1990, an even more important debate often gets lost: What did Japan get right in the 1960s\/70s in addressing some of the challenges China is facing today?<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>What influence did policy have over falling inequality and decreasing savings rates?<\/li>\n<li>How can Ikeda&#8217;s &#8220;income doubling plan&#8221; be evaluated in this light? Was it effective? This is interesting as the world gears up to analyse the outcomes of the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/billfischer\/2013\/11\/10\/chinas-3rd-plenum-what-the-smart-money-thinks\/\">Third Plenum<\/a>\u00a0of the CCP.<\/li>\n<li>How did Japan&#8217;s growth model become more geared towards domestic consumption and less reliant on gross capital formation growth, chiefly from the mid-1970s onwards?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Of course 1960s Japan and today&#8217;s China are not perfect comparables in terms of their economic structure.<\/p>\n<p>China&#8217;s reliance on exports (&gt;30% of GDP) is much higher than that of 1960s Japan&#8217;s (about 10% of GDP). China&#8217;s household sector is arguably more repressed than its yesteryear peer from Japan. Urbanisation rates are different, reaching 50% in today&#8217;s China but exceeding 60% in 1960 Japan. And this does not even touch on the differences in political systems.<\/p>\n<p>But still, in my mind, the Japan China wants to be looking towards for inspiration is the 1960s\/1970s version when the nature of the Japanese growth model changed away from a reliance on <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinadaily.com.cn\/opinion\/2011-02\/28\/content_12085793.htm\">heavy industry<\/a> and towards more consumption and higher-tech R&amp;D-based manufacturing.<\/p>\n<p>I hope to expand that list as I do more reading.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>I went to a presentation by Stephen Roach (former chief economist of Morgan Stanley) a couple of weeks ago. He started off with a good overview of current global financial imbalances. Yet I felt he fell short on delivering on &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/?p=2080\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7,16,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2080","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-china","category-economics","category-japan"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2080","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2080"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2080\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2090,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2080\/revisions\/2090"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2080"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2080"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benbansal.me\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2080"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}